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Limits of the competition state? The cultural political economy of 
European labour migration policies 
Labour migration has been revitalised as part of economic competition and growth 
strategies across Europe over the last decade. Scholars have framed policy changes 
towards more liberal recruitment as a turn towards ‘competition state’ and 
Schumpeterian innovation goals. This article evaluates the extent to which British, 
French and German labour admission policies are dominated by competition state 
logics. I apply a cultural political economy perspective, thereby substantiating this 
relatively new approach analytically and testing its usefulness for capturing the 
economic governance of labour migration. I argue that the highly selective 
arrangement of admissions - with regard to skill level targeted, and causal, spatial, 
and operational foci of recruitment - creates a fragmented cultural political 
economy of labour migration. While competition state logics shape the economic 
imaginary of ‘high-skilled global labour competiveness’, rival logics dominate the 
imaginaries of ‘skilled national labour shortages’, and ‘lower skilled EU labour 
self-sufficiency’. Findings pinpoint limits of competition state theory in explaining 
contemporary labour migration policy. I demonstrate that semiotic and regulatory 
selectivity is a key remedy for coping with competing state projects and associated 
policy tensions. The political ordering of labour migration simultaneously entails 
amplification and silencing of competition state logics in policies. 
Keywords: labour migration policy, cultural political economy, competition state 
theory, governance, comparative policy analysis 
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Introduction 
“Professional immigration is […] a tool for growth. […] We find ourselves in a 
reasoning of international football where the big teams recruit in the entire world, and 
these big teams happen to be in the finals. […] If you were to limit immigration 
options for great foreign professional players you could not become champion.” 
(French Migration Ministry Official, interviewed on 3 May 2010 in Paris) 
Talking in football metaphors, this government official in the French Migration Ministry 
conceives of the role of labour migrationi policy as enabler of economic growth and 
facilitator of foreign labour recruitment. Labour migration has been revitalised as part of 
economic competition and growth strategies across Europe in the still young twenty-first 
century. Recent studies contend that logics of competitiveness, innovation, and economic 
growth through foreign labour reproduction shape the emerging labour migration regimes 
in Europe (Menz 2009, Menz et al. 2010a). This contextualises labour migration policy in 
wider state transformation processes captured in ‘competition state’ theory (mainly: Cerny 
1997, 2010, Cerny et al. 2000, Evans et al. 2010). According to these authors, nation states 
respond to globalisation processes mainly with a pro-active facilitation of economic 
growth and competitiveness. 
Is labour migration policy (LMP) yet another expression of the ‘competition state’ 
then and if so, in what ways and to what extent? This article analyses LMP through a 
cultural political economy lens (Jessop 2008, 2009, Jessop et al. 2006) to evaluate the 
extent to which policies can be explained with competition state theory. The cultural 
political economy perspective offers so far lacking insights in the selective semiotic 
embedding of LMP in capitalist economies, thereby illuminating the strategic use of 
competitiveness logics, but also the lack thereof, in a multi-tiered economic governance of 
labour migration. Based on macro-economic and political significance, the paper uses 
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examples from France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) which have featured as the 
top three destinations for migrant workers in Europe for some decades now (OECD 2009), 
and have revitalised recruitment schemes at roughly the same time, with Britain being a 
slight forerunner. By concentrating on common tendencies in LMP across these major 
European capitalist economiesii the paper 1) stimulates a discussion about the emergence 
of shared organisational principles in European capitalism and 2) the role of labour 
migration in this process. The analysis concentrates on policies on so-called third country 
nationals (TCN), i.e. migrant workers from extra-EU countries. This does not seek to 
downgrade the importance of EU-internal work movements and the impact of EU-level 
policy on state regulation. To the contrary: the analysis reveals that EU free movement 
creates a versatile spatial reference point for TCN admissions. 
The article firstly introduces theoretical foundations in political economy with a 
particular commitment to cultural political economy (CPE) as so far developed by Bob 
Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum. To contest the extent to which idealtypical competition state 
logics inform LMP, I utilise the analytical device of economic imaginaries – understood 
here as highly selective semiotic systems that accentuate specific aspects of the socio-
economic world to frame policies (Jessop 2009). By means of interpretive policy analysis 
this article examines 1) legal classifications of migrant workers based on analysis of 30 
odd legal documents, and 2) the meanings of legal classifications based on interviews with 
25 high-ranking policy-makers in two empirical sections (list of documents and interviews 
in appendix). I thus identify the economic imaginaries that underpin LMP and assess 
resonances of competition state theory. 
The analysis exposes three distinct economic imaginaries which shape LMP: high-
skilled global labour competiveness, skilled national labour shortages, and lower skilled 
EU labour self-sufficiency. These form different realms of economic governance which 
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dictate diverse skill foci, policy drivers, spatial reference points, and modi operandi in 
LMP. In this fragmented cultural political economy of labour migration, only the first 
imaginary fully embraces competition state logics, while competing state projects gain 
prominence in the others. Not only is the resonance of competition state logics deliberately 
limited to the realm of high-skilled recruitment in a multi-tiered LMP. I moreover argue 
that this splitting-up of policies by skill level - and the associated selective amplification or 
silencing of economic competitiveness logics - enables capitalist states to resolve tensions 
between co-existing state projects vis-à-vis labour migration. These findings require us to 
redefine the scope and locus of the competition state in LMP, to acknowledge and theorise 
empirical fragmentations in statutory economic governance processes, and to sharpen our 
conceptual grasp of the political ordering of social and economic relations at the heart of 
all policy-making more generally. 
Labour migration in competition states? A cultural political economy lens 
The return to active foreign labour recruitment since the late 1990s in Europe – after the 
official suspension of post-war guest workers schemes following the 1970s oil crisis and 
subsequent economic recession – has triggered increasing academic attention. Manifold are 
the accounts of the economic and demographic ‘pressures’ that lead governments across 
Europe to once again support labour imports in their policy-making (e.g. Castles 2006, 
Menz 2009, Menz et al. 2010b, Ruhs et al. 2010). The political economy of foreign labour 
recruitment is on the verge of becoming a field of social scientific inquiry in its own right, 
with scholars predicting recruitment to remain resilient even in the current economic crisis 
(Castles 2011) and larger comparative research projects taking off (Pastore 2011). At the 
heart of these revived inquiries we often find the assumption that labour migration is yet 
‘another tool for growth’. To take account of the basic parameters of this argument, this 
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conceptual section firstly briefly depicts policy changes in France, Germany and the UK 
and their rhetorical bond to economic utility considerations. It then engages with the 
theoretical arguments around ‘competition state’ implied in this bond, problematises the 
limits of these arguments, and operationalises a CPE perspective to examine their 
relevance empirically. 
Economic utility in labour migration policy: articulation of competition states? 
Economic utility rhetoric accompanied the rebirth of foreign labour recruitment. 
Germany’s 2001 introduction of a ‘Green Card’ for IT workers forged a response to labour 
shortages in a specific field. A new Migration Law followed in 2005, and was underpinned 
by the assumption that the national economy “had to attract highly skilled immigrants to 
remain economically competitive” (Green 2007, p. 112). At roughly the same time, 
France’s then Home Secretary Nicolas Sarkozy initiated a new Migration Law (in force 
since 2006) with the aim to tailor labour flows to the country’s economic needs and select 
workers according to their professional utility (cf. Menz 2009). Since 2000 the British New 
Labour government expanded the so far relatively restrictive work permits system, opened 
more professional entry routes, and eventually consolidated all labour admission channels 
into a points-based system (PBS). Prime Minister Tony Blair at the time insisted on the 
‘essential’ role of labour migration for the ‘continued prosperity’ of the UK (Home Office 
2005). Demographic ageing and financial constraints on wages are believed to fuel foreign 
labour demand in Britain in sectors such as social care or nursing (Ruhs et al. 2010). 
The rediscovery of migrant workers as “potentially useful human resources” bears 
a strong notion of economic utility in all three cases: “Migrants are welcome as long as 
they promise to contribute to the prerogatives of a business-friendly national economic 
growth strategy” (Menz 2009, p. 31). The functionalist gist of this argument suggests that 
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national economies require labour migration if they want to compete successfully in a 
global marketplace, with governments being responsible to design supporting policies. The 
economic utility interpretation perceives LMP as adjacent of capitalist value and wealth 
accumulation, and thereby neatly aligns it with wider claims in political economy. It is not 
accidentally that Menz draws on Cerny’s (1997) ‘competition state’ concept in his analysis 
of LMP in twenty-first century Europe, and diagnoses a shift towards this model across the 
continent. We need to unpack the underlying theoretical claim before testing its empirical 
relevance. 
Cerny and colleagues have described a globalisation-induced shift from welfare 
state to competition state with which nation states respond to the perceived imperatives of 
globalisation (Cerny et al. 2000; Evans et al. 2010). They depict a changing role of state 
policy towards “the promotion of economic activities, whether at home or abroad, which 
will make firms and sectors located within the territory of the state competitive in 
international markets” (Cerny 1997, p. 272). A domestic ‘raison d’état’ embodied in the 
production of national welfare, social solidarity and justice has given way to a ‘raison du 
Monde’ which embraces the logics of economic association and international capitalist 
competition (Cerny 2010). Though born as an empirical-analytical concept capturing 
specific macro-economic trajectories in specific cases, the competition state heuristic is 
applied here for its quality as idealtypical benchmark of statutory economic coordination 
processes (for genealogy of and ongoing confusion over the concept see Evans et al. 2010). 
Competition state theory emerged in the context of neo-liberal reform agendas in Anglo-
American politics in the 1990s. The UK might serve as prime example of a competition 
state shift over the past three decades (Evans 2010), but also France and Germany are 
believed to “have moved more incrementally towards the competition state model” in the 
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2000s, with the European Union as an important “driving force” at their back (Evans et al. 
2010, p. 2). 
Bob Jessop’s famous portrayal of the Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime 
(SWPR) has diagnosed a similar tendency in contemporary state-economy relations 
(Jessop 2002). Among other claims, his work highlights the changing role of the state in 
securing the conditions for capitalist accumulation from Keynesian demand steering and 
active fiscal policies towards Schumpeterian growth strategies. The idealtypical SWPR 
embraces innovation as crucial means of wealth production and targets the promotion of a 
‘knowledge-based economy’ to boost innovation-induced growth. 
The described re-definitions of state functions bear consequences for the realm of 
labour migration beyond initial recruitment. Schierup et al. (2006) draw on Jessop’s work 
to highlight how Schumpeterian thinking has infiltrated policy-making across Europe, with 
economic citizenship approaches gaining more importance empirically. Recent case studies 
further confirm the weight of economic utility considerations for migrant’s social 
protection in Europe (Boswell et al. 2011, Carmel 2011, Hansen et al. 2010, Kaiser et al. 
2011). Clearly, the (anticipated) economic contribution of a migrant co-shapes their 
position and rights in the host country, regardless of continuing divergence in economic 
and welfare state coordination. But do these logics really dominate LMP in line with 
competition state theory, as Menz seems to suggest? 
I offer a sceptical answer to this question here. Whilst focusing on fundamental 
macro-level shifts in the logic of state-market relationships, concepts like the competition 
state or Jessop’s SPWR – at least if applied with an inclination to explaining an entire 
policy – partially obstruct the view on potential fragmentations and contradictions within 
policies. While the mentioned concepts, understood as idealtypical benchmarks, usefully 
accentuate part of the socio-economic formation to highlight the emergence of dominant 
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logics in capitalist economic governance, this analytical accentuation is less able to capture 
the highly segmented economic realities labour migrants experience. Different sectors of 
the economy might face socio-political limits to recruiting workers under a 
competitiveness and utility umbrella (Ruhs et al. 2010). The recent introduction of annual 
caps to third-country national workers in the UK but also the 2012 French presidential 
election campaign – with Nicolas Sarkozy demanding a halving of entry figures over the 
next five years – alludes to these limits. A more fine-grained scrutiny of the empirical 
articulations of competition state and Schumpeterian innovation in LMP – and their limits 
– is due to revaluate accounts that tend to view labour admission policy as a relatively 
uniform tool for economic growth. 
Semiosis and political ordering: a cultural political economy approach 
How can we achieve a more fine-grained analysis of LMP to assess the extent to which this 
policy area is dominated by competition state logics? I propose an interpretive policy 
analysis with specific focus on the selective political ordering processes involved in policy-
making. The study dedicates its analytical heart to the substance of public policy 
governance and its multiple normative inscriptions, dictating a strong methodological 
commitment to the interpretive turn in policy analysis (e.g. Yanow 2006). This takes 
Fischer’s (2003) critique of ‘conventional’ policy analysis seriously, which castigated the 
emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency of policy-making at the expense of capturing the 
underlying values, ideas and the contested character of policies as political ordering 
attempts. 
Interpretive policy analysts more generally suggest that “the effort to exclude 
meaning and values from the work of the policy analyst cuts the very heart out of political 
inquiry” (Fischer 2003, p. 216; also see: Gottweis 2003, Hajer et al. 2003, Yanow 2000, 
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2006). In this context, Jessop and Sum’s (2006) reflections on regulation and governance 
have highlighted the inherence of the norms underpinning a particular capitalist social 
formation in the respective modes of coordination. Illustrative of this claim is moreover 
Thrift’s (2010) study on the imagined role of ‘talents’ in a Schumpeterian economy 
discourse: ‘immaginnovation’ neutralises the claim that talents carry with them a virtue to 
almost miraculously boost companies’ innovation and creativity. From these perspectives, 
policies employ semiosis – or meaning-making – strategically to order the social world in a 
specific, and hence selective, way. 
By means of an interpretive policy analysis of LMP this paper examines the 
meanings policy-makers ascribe to the economic governance of labour migrationiii, and, 
ultimately, establishes resonances of competition state logics. The specific CPE lens, as 
developed by Jessop (2008, 2009) and together with Sum (2006) so far, has two major 
advantages for the analytical purposes of this article: 
•	 it helps exposing the strategic momentum of meaning-making in policy with its 
emphasis on selective framing and normative presumptions of policies; 
•	 it is particularly interested in economic formations and governance processes and 
hence offers a useful analytical toolbox and vocabulary for a study of labour 
migration vis-à-vis competition and innovation state logics. 
CPE provides an explanatory approach with a role for semiosis beyond relativism. 
This cutting-edge work rejects the notion of infinite interpretations, acknowledges the 
powerful role of privileged actors such as policy-makers to structure meaning-making 
processes, and offers an analytical entry point to expose why certain economic formations 
and interpretations are selected and become powerful. CPE suggests that the emergence of 
certain normative reference points and tools for economic coordination can be explained in 
11 
terms of their strategic variation, selection and retention (e.g. Jessop 2009). This concurs 
with authors who highlighted the constant, and strategically selective, creation of 
‘governable terrains’ (Carmel et al. 2008) and ‘governable objects’ in public policy 
(Gottweis 2003). Policy-making is hence understood here as an attempt of political 
ordering which engages with competing interpretations and structural sedimentations in a 
given policy field – labour migration in our case –, which selects and imposes specific 
semiotic orders, and ultimately structures subject positions of those governed through the 
policy. 
In migration policy, legislation imposes a range of selective symbolic orders: it 
draws on different economic, social and political assumptions to distinguish between 
‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ residents and workers; it paints many different shades of ‘legality’ in a 
plethora of permits and statuses; and it imposes highly selective borders to labour markets, 
welfare states, and political citizenship (more in Paul 2011a). The assertion here is that 
policy meanings – as imposed in state legislation – might be multiple, but they are not 
infinite. They display selective linkages to specific parts of the economy, labour market, 
welfare state etc. While policy meanings might be contested and unfinished, the political 
ordering implied in selective semiotic structuration through policies turns labour migrants 
into objects of governance and strongly shapes their experiences in host countries. 
CPE has so far not been applied in LMP analyses, giving this article an opportunity 
of both elaborating the perspective analytically and showcasing its usefulness for 
comprehending foreign labour recruitment policies in twenty-first century Europe. Jessop 
specifies entry points for an analysis in reference to economic imaginaries. He argues that 
a CPE approach: 
“highlights the role of discursively-selective institutions in the making of economic 
practices and, a fortiori, economic policies. Imaginaries are semiotic systems that 
12 
frame individual subjects’ lived experiences of an inordinately complex world and/or 
inform collective calculation about that world. [...] They identify, privilege, and seek 
to stabilize some economic activities from the totality of economic relations and 
transform them into objects of [...] governance.” (Jessop 2009, p. 344) 
The interpretive stance and CPE lens inform the research strategy of the article. By 
identifying the economic imaginaries of labour migration dominant in policy-making, it 
scrutinises a) the meanings and roles policy ascribes to labour migration and migrant 
workers, b) the selective character of these normative inscriptions, and c) the strategic and 
selective contextualisation of LMP in competing symbolic orders within the wider socio-
economic formation. If Menz’ account of LMP is correct, we would have to expect a 
dominance of an economic imaginary that exhibits logics of competitiveness and 
innovation across French, German and British labour recruitment policies. However, the 
problematisation of competition state theory anticipates limits to these logics in a more 
fragmented socio-economic formation empirically. 
Utility is not (always) enough: legal classifications of migrant workers 
In historical perspective, labour migration is a prime example of a selective re-
interpretation: after a policy and rhetoric of ‘zero immigration’ dominated Western Europe 
for almost 30 years, recruitment is now a case of ‘economic utility’. Can we trace 
sedimentations of competition and innovation state projects in legal provisions for labour 
migrant admissions? This section presents an analysis of de jure admission criteria and 
right regimes to draw out key legal classification principles and assess them in light of 
competition state theory. 
How exactly do the revitalised labour migration regimes of the twenty-first century 
categorise and select workers according to the utilitarian claims by Chancellor Schröder, 
President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Blair at the time? An analysisiv of legal documents 
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exposes two ingredients of the economic utility approach in LMP (see table 1): selection 
by labour scarcity and selection by skill level with highly differential effects on migrant 
workers’ rights. Country of origin also figures important and will be considered later in 
this section. 
Utilitarianism by default: selecting by labour scarcity 
The legal emphasis on labour scarcity highlights a hardly surprising utilitarian policy 
design of labour admissions. By default policies target economically useful foreign 
workers. More precisely, all migrants need a valid job offer when they apply for entry 
clearance as a worker. Public authorities then use this job offer in two ways to establish 
labour scarcity. The applicant can pass a resident labour market test (RLMT) for the 
offered position. In this case, the RLMT checks the availability of domestic, resident or EU 
workers before admitting a third country national into a specific job in a specific labour 
market district. This establishes a principle of preference of the mentioned groups of 
workers over newcomers and thus addresses employment protection goals. Alternatively, 
the job and migrant skill profile have to match a shortage list defined by employment 
agencies and special advisory bodies. Non-availability of otherwise preferred workers is 
taken for granted due to longer-term labour market observation. In both scenarios, the 
utility of a migrant based on scarcity of their skills profile determines entry options. 
This utilitarian logic is maintained throughout the initial residence period: work 
permits are usually valid for a specific job only and each change of position and/or 
employer has to be approved by the relevant Home Office or Labour Ministry agencies. 
Utilitarian selectivity at entry hence precedes a utilitarian delineation of residency and 
settlement paths, at least until a change of status provides a more decommodified status 
(e.g. to long-term resident with more free movement rights). This confirms Schierup et 
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al.’s (2006) claims of economic citizenship: migrant workers’ labour, free movement, 
residence and settlement rights clearly depend upon their economic utility, at least initially. 
Uneven application of utility logics: selecting by skill level 
Scarcity might be a crucial guiding principle in foreign worker admissions, but its 
application is highly uneven across different skill levels and does not always serve as 
sufficient entry condition. Labour scarcity checks are superfluous for especially well 
sought after high-skilled professionals; yet, economic utility is not enough in case of 
relatively restrictive lower skilled admissions. All three countries constitute a legal 
distinction between high-skilled, skilled and lower skilled/unskilled workers and use it to 
act upon different imagined parts of the economy. Rather than engaging in a detailed 
description of what these skill levels mean practically, my point here is that the construal 
of a skills divide is used in policies to construct different realms for intervention. 
Legislation in all three countries treats high-skilled workers most benevolently and offers 
them advantageous statuses while opening only very limited or no options for others and 
containing their residence rights much more tightly. 
Typically, legislation waives the otherwise obligatory shortage evaluations for a 
defined circle of ‘high-skilled’ workers (academics and scientists, blue collars, leading 
specialists, artists, graduate job seekers, and intra-corporate transfers in multinational 
companies) and offers more encompassing rights to them. For example, the German 
Niederlassungserlaubnis (permanent residence permit) has created an immediate 
settlement pathway, free labour market access and full family reunion rights to high-ranked 
academics, specialists and blue collars since 2005. Since 2006 a renewable three-year 
permit for ‘skills and talents’ entails multi-annual stays and eventual settlement in France. 
Specific post-study work routes give domestic graduates free and non-subordinated labour 
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market access (the UK abolished this route in spring 2012). Scientists enjoy facilitated 
access without RLMT, and governments have moreover designed specific intra-corporate 
transfer (ICT) routes with similar benefits. 
ICT mirror a particularly interesting assumption: they are not treated as migrants 
per se but as temporary professional movers between the global sites of multinational 
corporations. They do not count into the annual cap for tier 2 workers in the UK for 
example, and the usual integration requirements for migrants – sufficient language 
proficiency etc. – do not apply. At the same time, ICT workers are strictly bound to the 
condition of temporality: they cannot apply for settlement (France), their permit is strictly 
fixed-term, and it cannot be renewed from within the country (UK and Germany). In this 
case, economic utility considerations in support of multinational companies’ global labour 
demands hit the margins of the domestic labour market. If their role as globally moving 
experts is ruptured by settlement intentions, the preference of domestic labour is 
reintroduced in the assessment of their legitimate position in the host country’s labour 
market. 
The focus on domestic labour supply is starker for skilled and certainly starkest for 
lower skilled jobs. Migrant employees coming via a shortage route or the RLMT are much 
more restricted than their high-skilled colleagues. They are tied to one employer and 
receive fixed term work-residence permits for the exact duration of the work contract. The 
defined lower skilled realm implies additional checks and exposes a deliberate cut-off of 
the utilitarian economic demand-and-supply logic, eventually. For example, the German 
Federal Employment Agency can block admissions of lower skilled workers if the 
company wanting to recruit is planning domestic redundancies, or if the given labour 
district suffers from significant above average unemployment. The UK has never activated 
its tier 3 for lower skilled admissions. Skill level, domestic employment protection, and 
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scarcity assessments hence seem to intersect in the shaping of migrants’ entry routes 
beyond straightforward economic utility assumptions. 
Beyond economic rationales: selecting by country of origin 
Table 1 demonstrates that labour scarcity and skill level selectivity are conflated with 
selection by country of origin. For example, French bilateral migration management 
agreements with former colonies define – and often numerically restrict – skilled entry 
routes for specific nationals. Equally, the use of two different shortage lists allows ample 
recruitment of lower skilled Bulgarians and Romanians while reducing entry options for 
TCN workers to skilled and high-skilled realms. Bilateral agreements in Germany have 
mainly favoured potential EU accession candidates (e.g. care workers from Croatia) and 
excluded others. While not operating bilateral agreements, the UK’s early and full 
embracement of EU free movement in the wake of the accession of Central and Eastern 
European countries (A8) in 2004 and the simultaneous deferral of tier 3 lower skilled work 
routes fuelled a clear selection by origin as well. Consequently, EU free movement in all 
cases structures lower skilled labour admission: it crowds out the utilitarian legitimacy of 
TCN recruitment and limits them to domestic and EU recruitment options (more in Paul 
2011b). 
The analysis of legal categorisations revealed that LMP follows economic utility 
logics with a focus on labour scarcity. This seems unsurprising from a political economy 
viewpoint and confirms Menz’ account of migrant labour’s utility in the context of growth 
and competition strategies. Yet, we do not observe a unitary policy field governed by one 
guiding principle. The uneven application of the scarcity imperative for admissions of 
different skill levels alludes to a co-existence of several state projects and highlights 
respective limits to economic utility and competition state logics. The variation of the 
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scarcity theme – from high-skilled admissive migration regimes to almost exclusive 
reliance on EU labour in lower skilled jobs – receives analytical attention in the next 
empirical section. The inquiry in policy-makers’ sense-making of versatile admission 
regimes will help to shed light on the meanings of these regulatory structurations. 
Limits of competition state? Three economic imaginaries of labour migration 
To make sense of the skills division of labour entry routes and trace associated policy 
meanings and state projects, this section draws on CPE’s analytical concept of economic 
imaginary. I identify four key elements in the selective arrangement of these imaginaries: 
1) skill-level focus, 2) policy rationales (causal focus), 3) spatial focus of recruitment, and 
4) emerging dominant modes of recruitment (operational focus). The specific arrangement 
of these elements is guided by the skills divide: the specific enunciation of causal, spatial 
and operational focus varies considerably by skill level. The respective privileging of very 
different economic activities fuels a division of the policy field into three distinct economic 
imaginaries which selectively accentuate different policy rationales, spatial reference 
points and modi operandi, and further draw on highly miscellaneous metaphorical 
language (see synopsis of analysis in table 2): 
•	 Imaginary 1 regulates high-skilled migration in the context of alleged global labour 
competition, 
•	 Imaginary 2 regulates skilled migration in the context of national labour shortages, 
•	 Imaginary 3 regulates lower skilled admissions in the context of a perceived EU 
labour self-sufficiency in this realm. 
The remainder of the section will substantiate these imaginaries and analyse their meanings 
and linkages to competition state and Schumpeterian innovation logics. 
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Imaginary 1: High-skilled global labour competitiveness 
Policy-makers construe high-skilled labour migration as part of a genuinely global 
economy (spatial focus) and frame foreign labour supply as a tool to remain competitive 
(causal focus). High-skilled migration notionally serves the ‘national economic interest’ 
and fuels hopes of boosting domestic innovation and economic growth. This is the context 
in which the French official talked of a ‘tool for growth’ in the introductory quotation of 
the article. The basic postulation extensively expressed across interviews is that the 
national economy’s success in international competition is inhibited by obstacles to high-
skilled migration and global mobility (Box 1). 
We find clear evidence of competition state logics and Schumpeterian innovation 
targets in this part of the policy discourse. Supported by metaphors with strong positive 
connotations such as ‘greasing the engine’ (UK5), ‘gold dust’ (statement 2) or comparative 
allusions to international football ‘champions’ (FRA6) policy-makers construe and 
construct openness to high-skilled migration (operational focus) as a matter of competition 
for scarce global professional elites. The very scarcity of high-skilled elites and their 
almost magical qualities to boost competitiveness, innovation and growth makes them the 
target of benevolent admission and right regimes in the competition for the ‘brightest 
minds’ (GER3). Their decision to come to France, Germany or the UK, rather than going 
elsewhere, supposedly implies a big advantage for the business location as a whole. 
Box 1: Constructing the high-skilled global labour competitiveness imaginary 
S1: “I do think at a certain level, however, we are a world economy. And in a 
world economy, that is where we have tiers 1 and partly 2, there are people who circulate 
around the whole world economy, so that is not so much the skill needs of our particular 
economy, it is the way our businesses work. [...] Global companies operate globally […] And 
the question is [...] whether we want those companies to be active in the UK and see the UK as 
a base. Well, my basic answer to that question is: yes!” (UK8) 
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S2: “Someone [...] who works for a certain large UK airway manufacturer [...] 
takes the view that if someone in this field comes up then we hire them, not because we need a 
job, but because if we don't hire them General Electric will, and these people are like gold 
dust.” (UK1) 
S3: “One of our primary economic interests is to offer sufficient options and 
conditions for highly qualified individuals [...] in order to be attractive in a global context. 
This is where we are in competition with others, especially [...] with the English-speaking 
countries.” (GER10) 
We can observe the surfacing of a naturalised economic utility myth in the 
reference to desirable ‘talents’ and ‘potentials’: their huge beneficial impact on the national 
economy seems to be beyond doubt, and affective language supports the ongoing 
‘imaginnovation’ in a Thriftian manner. To limit recruitment to the national or EU realm is 
thought to prompt detrimental effects to the competitive position of the domestic business 
location: “These days, we live and die by our ability to attract inward investment […] [and] 
if you are an international business you need the ability to bring people in” (UK1; similar 
statements by GER8 and FRA7). 
Rhetorically, this clearly sets labour recruitment in a spatial framework of global or 
‘world economy’ (statement 1) without territorial borders, even though bureaucratic 
hurdles are certainly also met by ‘gold dust’ migrants in practice. Operationally, this 
establishes a need to compete for a highly mobile international labour force without 
references to the domestic labour market. This construal of high-skilled global mobility 
and competitiveness feeds into the construction of legal structures that favour high-skilled 
migrants (previous section). It has even born more global ramifications on European and 
OECD level demanding more openness towards high-skilled workers, and an increasing 
number of academics internalise or premise the alleged benefits of liberal high-skilled 
migration regimes (Cerna 2009, OECD 2009, Zaletel 2006). Their creation of indices to 
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rank countries’ openness in that respect announces the emergence of a new subset of the 
competitiveness ‘knowledge brand’ (Sum 2009). 
Imaginary 2: Skilled national labour shortages 
The second imaginary focuses on skilled migrant labour. It perceives foreign labour 
recruitment as a legitimate satisfaction of urging labour demand (causal focus), but also 
specifies clear limitations to demand-led admissions. Policy experts and documents use 
terms like ‘economic need’, ‘demand’, ‘specific shortage’ and ‘add-on’ abundantly to 
describe the drivers of recruitment in this imaginary and to specify migrant workers’ role. 
Statements 2 and 3 in box 2 summarise this plainly: migrants fill labour market gaps and 
satisfy companies ‘immediate’ needs. 
This part of the imagined economy is clearly distinguished from the pursuit of 
competitiveness and the duties of a competition state. Unlike in the global competitiveness 
imaginary where high-skilled professionals diversify labour supply and boost innovation, 
recruitment of ‘skilled’ foreign workers is not perceived as valuable in itself. Statement 2 
alludes to a fine nuance between workers ‘who bring a bonus’ enabling ‘better growth’ 
(high-skilled) and those who fill a shortage (skilled). A UK interviewee metaphorically 
describes tier 2 shortage applicants as ‘cogs in the engine’ who are recruited ‘for a specific 
reason’ much in contrast to tier 1 high-skilled workers who ‘grease the engine’ (UK5). 
Skilled migrant workers do not carry extra potential of innovation themselves but their 
very filling of a shortage helps to keep the growth machine going. 
Box 2: Constructing the skilled national labour shortages imaginary 
S1: “Why do we need labour migration? Because we need skilled workers 
(Fachkräfte). That means that the labour market is in the centre. [...] So the main rationale is: 
labour migration as an add-on where the domestic labour market does not supply enough 
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employees but not where we have enough domestic workers. This is the be-all and end-all of 
labour migration.“ (GER3) 
S2: “The foreign worker is someone who satisfies labour market needs, or who 
brings a competency with them - a bonus - that will enable better growth. Eventually, 
everyone benefits. But under no circumstances […] is the foreign workers someone who ruins 
French jobs.” (FRA6) 
S3: “Just because there’s a shortage doesn’t necessarily make an automatic case 
for immigration. Immigration can be an efficient way of responding to a shortage, but it’s 
often not the only way. […] So when we talk to employers, we say: ok, we accept that you 
have a shortage. We also ask: what are you doing about it? Have you tried to raise wages? 
Have you tried to train domestic workers?” (UK7) 
The shortage routes introduced in legislation mirror the ‘add-on’ logic in their strict 
orientation towards demand-led selection and specific skills profiles (operational focus). 
Temporary permits and entry routes for paid employees are supposed to address short- and 
mid-term shortages on the respective labour markets. They shape skilled migrant workers’ 
constrained place by fixed-term permits and obligatory links to one employer, their 
recruitment is contingent on the domestic labour market situation. Policy-makers deem this 
necessary for similar reasons: foreign workers must not ‘ruin French jobs’, unemployed 
Germans must come first, and British employers must be asked to raise wages or train 
domestic workers in the longer term (see box 2). 
In contrast to the high-skilled global competitiveness imaginary, the protection of 
the domestic labour market prominently enters the stage in this part of LMP. There is, 
moreover, a significant temporal focus within this imaginary which departs from 
competitiveness rationales. Policy-makers argue for a prospective need to train of the 
domestic workforce and to become less ‘reliant’ on migrant workersv. While it seems 
acceptable to recruit skilled migrant workers into shortages today, employers are asked – 
and indeed claim themselves to be committed – to develop domestic labour supply 
strategies for the future at the same time (see e.g. statement 3). Regardless of the practical 
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feasibility or seriousness of the thus claimed domestic training efforts, the aspiration in 
itself demarcates borders for legal TCN recruitment: a recent redefinition of the UK 
shortage list (UK Border Agency 2011) lifted tier 2 entry requirements to graduate level 
jobs and eventually took meat-cutting and lower skilled nursing off the list. 
Imaginary 3: lower skilled EU labour self-sufficiency 
Statement 1 in box 2 offers evidence of a veritable skills border within the shortage logic: 
it alludes to a cut-off of the demand-led recruitment approach for lower skilled jobs (skills 
focus) and emphasises the aim to rely on the domestic and EU workforce to fill these 
shortages self-sufficiently (operational and spatial focus). This thinking bridges the gap to 
our third imaginary. The data entail a wide-spread denial of low-skilled labour demand by 
policy-makers in all three cases, with the exception of seasonal agricultural routes (which 
are not considered here due to their strict temporal limitation, usually to stays no longer 
than 6 months at once). 
Box 3: Constructing the lower skilled EU labour self-sufficiency imaginary 
S1: “It’s not completely normal that we lack wood-cutters in France, if you wish, 
this does not demand a high qualification. […] We should be able to demand and offer a job to 
low-skilled unemployed people in France, as a kind of obligation. But we most often find that, 
unfortunately, that’s not what happens, meaning that the individuals under consideration are 
not capable or willing to do the job” (FRA6) 
S2: “Low skilled work [...] should be done by resident workers and also by 
European workers. They don't, we don't need to bring people in from abroad to do that. [...] 
But they [European workers] do amply fill the gaps that would otherwise need to be filled by a 
greater number of residents and by non-European workers.” (UK5) 
S3: “Forget about the bilateral agreements. With the implementation of full free 
movement, bilateral agreements will vanish, I’d say. Now, it might take a bit longer with 
Croatia until they are member and enjoy free movement, but it otherwise does not play any 
role.” (GER5) 
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As statements in box 3 indicate, policy-makers assume that lower skilled labour is in 
abundant supply on the domestic and European labour market and does therefore not need 
to be imported from third countries. Several policy-makers make a dual reference to the 
domestic worker population in this last imaginary: a) as a workforce to be activated in case 
of unemployment – also with penalising measures if necessary – and b) as a politically 
susceptible group to be protected from labour market competition with TCN workers. They 
construe a genuine responsibility of resident workers to respond to lower skilled labour 
shortages and link activation and employment policy targets to this role interpretation 
(statements 1 and 2). A Sector Skills Council official mentions the ‘duty’ of the domestic 
unemployed to ‘pull their socks up’ and fill lower skilled positions (UK6). Eventually, 
utilitarianism in foreign labour recruitment ends at the frontiers of domestic labour market 
and workfare aspirations and is being reconsidered constantly. Utilitarianism towards 
labour market newcomers is conditioned by the degree of utilitarianism and workfarism 
targeted at domestic labour market participants and fuels an operational focus on labour 
self-sufficiency. 
One French official (statement 1) discusses the boundary between ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ shortages in that regard. This addresses the fluidity of the perceived 
‘legitimacy’ of foreign labour recruitment: the matching of empirical economic situations 
with legal matters of fact fluctuates between imaginaries. Woodcutting in France might be 
a shortage job today and form part of the shortage imaginary de facto, yet the political 
aspiration might be to move it into the self-sufficiency realm. A similar observation has 
been made for the UK’s changing shortage definitions (i.e. to take meat cutters off the list 
in 2011). This indicates that politically constructed boundaries of economic imaginaries 
operating in LMP retain their permeable, unfinished and contested character. 
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The causal focus on protecting and activating the domestic workforce in the self-
sufficiency imaginary is directly linked to a spatial focus on the EU labour market; with 
far-reaching consequences for TCN labour entry options. EU integration and the 
imperative of free movement – with temporary restrictions for new accession countries – 
requires that any labour protective measure for nationals from one member state must 
include all other EU nationals as well. Policy-makers therefore picture a vastly abundant 
labour supply, if not domestically, than ‘certainly from the EU’ (UK8, see statements 2 and 
3 in box 3). They have put into practice legislation to recruit lower skilled labour almost 
exclusively from within the EU – be it via bilateral agreements with Croatian care-workers 
(Germany), a distinct longer lower-skilled shortage list for Bulgarians and Romanians 
(France), or a waiving of all restrictions for new EU member state nationals combined with 
a simultaneous suspension of tier 3 for TCN lower skilled workers (UK). These legal 
structures determinedly contextualise lower skilled recruitment options within a European 
labour geographyvi . 
The preference of EU workers in all cases reduces TCN workers’ entry options to 
high-skilled competiveness and some selected skilled shortage routes. Lower skilled jobs 
seem unrelated to competitiveness and innovation targets, and the operational focus in the 
lower skilled labour migration segment does not offer much scope for add-on to the 
domestic workforce, even in shortage situations. Shortages here are perceived as a matter 
of steering – and if needed activating – domestic employment and forging a self-sufficient 
EU labour market. The wide-spread fight against so-called ‘illegal’ migration – most often 
in lower skilled economic sectors– further carves out this imaginary. Economic utility 
considerations are not accepted as legitimate here even though the reality of informal 
cheap labour suggests high levels of utility in practice. Some have suggested that this 
‘malign neglect’ (Samers 2010; also Morice et al. 2010) of informal employment indicates 
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that the illegalisation of migrant workers through restrictive policy-making serves very 
own policy objectives of increasing the utility of cheap exploitable labour. While 
legislation does clearly construct a legal/illegal divide, the ‘fashioning of precarious 
workers’ (Anderson 2010) as one consequence of this divide does not seem to be part of 
the economies that policy-makers – whether in labour ministries or home offices – 
imagine in official debates. Equally the geopolitics of LMP by which host countries 
manage historically emerged labour geographies, post-colonial relationships, guest worker 
legacies but also ‘race relations’ more generally, seems largely silenced in this context (see 
Paul 2011b, Hansen et al. 2010). 
We have come a long way from the admissive high-skilled competitiveness 
imaginary to almost complete closure towards lower skilled workers from outside the EU. 
The analysis of legal classifications in LMP and their normative underpinnings expressed 
in economic imaginaries exposes contradictions between global competitiveness and 
economic openness goals on the one hand, and national labour market governance 
objectives on the other hand. Limits to the state’s competitiveness and innovation agenda 
are clearly visible in policies designed for skilled and lower skilled migrants. 
Competitiveness logics contextualise some aspects of LMP, but not others. It is the very 
division of admission regimes by skill level and the selective contextualisation of the 
divided policy in different economic imaginaries that seemingly resolves tensions between 
co-existing state projects. 
Divide and rule: Selective use of competition state logics in the political 
ordering of labour migration 
This article has set out to scrutinise the articulation of competition state logics in LMP. The 
study of legal classifications in France, Germany and the UK exposed a hegemonic 
discourse of economic utility in labour admissions which serves as necessary entry 
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condition. Labour scarcity is the guiding principle in utilitarian foreign worker admissions, 
yet its application is highly uneven across different skill levels and is not always accepted 
as being sufficient. Labour scarcity checks are superfluous for especially well sought after 
high-skilled professionals, while lower skilled workers have very limited entry options 
regardless. A CPE analysis exposed that the selective structuration of policies by skill level 
creates specific roles and scopes for high-skilled, skilled and lower skilled migrants 
according to the aspects of the economy that legislation selectively highlights and 
prioritises. The different skill levels targeted, policy drivers, spatial reference points, and 
modi operandi are arranged into three distinct economic imaginaries of labour migration: 
high-skilled global labour competiveness, skilled national labour shortages, and EU lower 
skilled labour self-sufficiency. We find a dominant logic of easy access for high-skilled 
migrants in the global competitiveness imaginary, supported by positive metaphorical 
connotations. Yet, the logic of global competitiveness and Schumpeterian innovation 
collapses in the other two imaginaries and is replaced by, or conflated with, competing 
state projects such as domestic employment protection. 
Limits of competition state theory 
These findings raise several questions for discussion and expose the limitations of this 
research at the same time. The first addresses the empirical scope and locus of competition 
state as dominant state project in LMP. The absence of global labour market references, the 
very specific, closely contained and restrictive admission procedures in the skilled shortage 
imaginary, and the concentration on self-reliance with the EU labour market and domestic 
workfare for lower skills; they all demonstrate the limits of the competition state ‘at home 
and abroad’. Utilitarianism towards labour market newcomers ‘abroad’ is strongly 
conditioned by the degree of utilitarianism targeted at domestic labour market participants 
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‘at home’. Especially lower skilled and non-shortage skilled admission policy does not 
adhere to competitiveness and innovation targets. It is presented as a matter of steering – 
and if needed activating – domestic employment and forging a self-sufficient EU labour 
market. 
This means that the competition state as an idealtypical benchmark is present and 
absent in labour migration policy-making at the same time. The tightness of the link 
depends on the part of the economy that is being accentuated. The dominant principle of 
global competitiveness and easy recruitment in the high-skilled realm co-exists quite 
comfortably with national protectionism and closure towards foreign labour entries for 
lower skilled jobs. This speaks of much more fragmented ‘real’ political economies and 
economic governance responses than some LMP accounts would have us suggest. 
Regarding labour migration at least, economic coordination does not embrace 
competitiveness and innovation logics unconditionally, but arranges policy meanings 
selectively and attaches them to different parts of a fragmented political economy. Even 
more nuanced sectoral analyses of LMP (i.e. Caviedes 2010) so far rather neglect the 
regulatory skills divide governing migrant recruitment within economic sectors. 
This finding is striking from a comparative perspective as it exposes cross-country 
similarity in the economic coordination and selective embedding of labour migration in 
three big labour-attracting European economies. Subtle variations within this pattern can of 
course be expected: what ‘competitiveness’ and ‘economic utility’ really means, for 
example, might vary across capitalist varieties, welfare state regimes and labour markets 
(Menz 2010, Papadopoulos 2011, Paul 2011a). While more comparative research into the 
economic governance of LMP seems essential for more nuanced accounts of migration in 
variable competition states, the shared partition of LMP by skill level found in this article 
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indicates a common pattern of political ordering of migrant workers’ legitimate position in 
European capitalisms. 
Competing state projects and political ordering 
Irrespective of potential divergences, the uneven embracement of competition state logics 
by migrant skill level in Britain, France and Germany alike bears implications for 
governance theory more generally. LMP amply reflects the contradictions between global 
competitiveness and economic openness goals on the one hand, and national labour market 
governance objectives on the other. The tensions between co-existing state projects and 
narratives in migration policy – economic growth, security and anti-terrorism, social 
cohesion, domestic welfare, justice and democratic legitimacy – have been described at 
length (e.g. Boswell et al. 2011, Carmel et al. 2010). 
The present CPE analysis has indicated that the product of the multiplicity of state 
projects is by no means chaotic or anarchic. To the contrary: the selective partitioning of 
the socio-economic world into three specific economic imaginaries and associated legal 
classifications in LMP speaks of a powerful construction of ‘structured complexity’ 
(Jessop 2009). The very fragmentation of the imagined economy in question allows 
governments to pursue contradictory objectives, to clearly demarcate different spaces for 
legitimate foreign labour recruitment, to structure them according to different objectives, 
and to render other imaginable positions and roles illegitimate, criminal and ‘illegal’. 
Labour migration policy hence serves as a powerful example of the state’s political 
ordering of social and economic relationships by means of semiotic and legal 
classifications, with far-reaching consequences for the roles ascribed to labour migrants, 
domestic and EU workers, and employers alike. 
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The confession of state-centrism is certainly writ-large throughout this article. The 
empirical insights gained here sustain the assumption that we cannot write off state 
regulation in economic and societal governance processes: though always contested, the 
ongoing legal classifications of migrant workers in LMP according to variable policy 
drivers tell a tale of the powerful hand of state regulation. Rather than adhering completely 
to a hegemonic project of competitiveness, public policies simultaneously support, steer 
and restrain the infamous ‘invisible hand’ of a globalising market in order to reconcile 
competing state projects. 
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Table 1: Comparison of selection principles and policy tools in migrant labour admission policies 
Selection 
Principle 
Selection 
Mechanism 
Germany France United Kingdom 
Scarcity 
of skills 
Resident Labour 
Market Test (RLMT) 
Shortage Lists 
for all skilled and lower skilled entries 
apart from ICT and domestically 
skilled; institutionalised at Federal 
Employment Agency 
for all lower skilled entries; for skilled 
jobs which are not on shortage lists or 
ICT; institutionalised at regional 
employment agencies 
for all tier 2 (general) entries apart from 
in-country applications and high 
earners; not institutionalised, 
employers’ attestation suffices 
for skilled and unskilled TCN mainly 
from A8, A2 and extended Europe (e.g. 
Croatia) 
for higher skilled and skilled TCN (also 
regularisation); distinct larger list for A2 
for selected graduate professions only; 
instead use of free A8 and A2 
movement 
Graduate qualifications/ 
professional experience 
beneficial permanent permit for high-
skilled professionals and academics; 
extra scientist and specialist (mainly 
IT) route; ICT route 
beneficial permits for graduates, 
experienced professionals, facilitated 
entry for project-based work and 
scientists; ICT route 
tier 1 visa for high-skilled individuals 
(world-leading academics and artists); 
tier 2 (general) for graduate level jobs; 
tier 2 for ICT route 
Skill level Earning thresholds as 
qualification proxy 
for permanent residence permit for 
high-skilled professionals who are not 
academics 
for ICT and post-study work visa 
RLMT waived for tier 2 high earners; 
longer visa for some well-earning ICT; 
minimum earnings for tier 2 general 
and ICT 
Lower skilled access 
suspension of generic routes, some 
bilateral agreements, access mainly for 
EU nationals or accession candidates 
(Croatia mainly) 
suspension of generic routes, exclusive 
access for EU nationals 
suspension of tier 3, exclusive access 
for EU nationals 
Origin of 
Domestic qualifications 
post-study work route; work permits 
for tolerated residents with domestic 
qualifications 
post-study work route; exceptional 
regularisation of irregular workers in 
shortage professions 
post-study work route 
skills 
Advantageous labour 
market access 
for nationals from some rich countries 
for Algerians, if admitted; for some 
nationals from former colonies in 
extended shortage lists 
x 
Source: author’s analysis of legal documents and comparative compilation; details in endnote iv; as of October 2011 
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Table 2: Characteristics of economic imaginaries in labour migration policies 
Imaginaries 
Focus in admissions 
High-skilled global labour competitiveness 
Skilled national short-term labour 
shortages 
Lower skilled EU labour self-sufficiency 
Skill level focus 
High-skilled, very scarce skills, globally 
mobile skills; post-study work options for 
graduates 
Skilled workers in ‘scarce’ professions, up-
skilling efforts in national workforce 
Low and unskilled, and skilled if not in 
scarce supply; assumed ‘vast’ domestic and 
EU supply 
Causal focus 
Support economic competitiveness and 
attractiveness of national business location; 
support innovation and growth; secure fiscal 
benefits through high earning migrants 
Secure short-term economic productivity in 
shortage situations; boost domestic labour 
supply longer term to prevent reliance on 
migrants 
Secure domestic/EU labour supply; lower 
reliance on migrants; activate domestic 
unemployed; manage and contain informal 
labour market 
Spatial focus 
Globally mobile labour pool and globally 
operating companies; ‘world economy’ dis-
embedded from national labour market 
Global supply in case of domestic shortages; 
sometimes in bilateral recruitment only or 
EU worker preference; embedded in current 
and prospective national labour market 
Reliance on EU and domestic workers to fill 
shortages; priority of domestic employment 
and activation policies; ignorance (or 
‘malign neglect’, Samers 2010) towards 
global informal labour supply 
Operational focus 
Global supply-led recruitment in competition 
for ‘brightest minds’, global ‘war’ for talent; 
highly beneficial admission and residence 
regimes 
Selective demand-led recruitment as ‘add-
on’ to domestic shortages; fine-tuned 
identification of shortage and containment of 
worker in that shortage job; state-led labour 
market command and control in promotion 
of domestic up-skilling 
Exclusivity of EU and domestic supply to fill 
shortages; activation and ‘matching’ by 
state; strictly controlled bilateral agreements 
with third countries in exceptional cases; 
fight against informal work and residence 
Metaphorical 
underpinning 
of imaginary 
Discourse of ‘talents’ and ‘high potentials’ 
signifies innovation capacity; ‘gold dust’ 
signifies scarce skills and magical quality of 
some migrants to boost innovation and 
growth; ‘greasing the engine’; rolling out 
‘red carpet’ with beneficial treatment 
Discourse of ‘economic need’, ‘demand’, 
‘specific shortage’ and ‘add-on’ signifies 
demand-led focus; concrete space for 
migrants as ‘cogs in the engine’ with specific 
and contained role; discourse on ‘reliance’ 
signifies future self-sufficiency aspirations 
Use of attributes like ‘amply’ and ‘enough’ 
signifies abundance of domestic/EU labour 
supply; reference to ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ 
of domestic unemployed to ‘pull socks up’ 
ascribes responsive role to them with regard 
to achieving labour self-sufficiency 
Source: author’s analysis of semi-structured interviews with policy-makers in further elaboration of table 1 
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i With ‘labour migration’ I refer to those migrant flows admitted into host countries in their 
function as ‘worker’. Of course, that does not deny that other migrants (i.e. refugees, students 
or family members) participate in the labour market as well. 
ii Drawing on comparative capitalist coordination theories I explore the comparative nuances of 
LMP when being contextualised in different capitalisms elsewhere (Paul 2011a). 
iii Potential socio-political, ethno-cultural or electoral agendas are not captured in this paper. I trace 
the comparative contextualisation of cross-nationally shared economic imaginaries of labour 
migration in individual societal environments in the larger project of which this article 
constitutes but a small part (see Paul 2011a). 
iv I draw on category analysis (Yanow 2000): a mapping of selection mechanisms and associated 
policy tools in legal documents is used to identify selection principles (i.e. the principles 
according to which migrant workers are selected and stratified in different access routes) and, 
ultimately, emerging categories of ‘admissible’ migrant workers. Interview data then 
elucidated the meanings of these categories and selection principles and allowed a tracing of 
underpinning economic imaginaries that selectively assemble these meanings and hold them 
together. 
v The assumption of quasi complete domestic labour market control through state policy within the 
skilled shortage imaginary is striking. The identification and filling of shortages is presented 
as a mere technicality; domestic ‘upskilling’ efforts are conceived as a functional prospect. 
This disregards well-researched phenomena like the lack of funding for training (especially in 
the UK), wage constraints, unattractive working conditions, and the structural reliance on 
informal labour in some sectors (Morice et al. 2010; Ruhs et al. 2010). 
vi The specific embeddedness within this geography varies, for example France and Germany 
embraced EU free movement for new accession country nationals more cautiously than the 
UK and restricted access initially (Paul 2011b). 
